Contents
CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
CHAPTER II
WARFARE-TECHNOLOGY-INTERFACE
2.1. Evolution of Warfare
2.1.1. First Generation Warfare
2.1.2. Second Generation Warfare
2.1.3. Third Generation Warfare
2.1.4. Fourth Generation Warfare
2.1.4.1. Changing actors on the battlefield
2.1.4.2. The Emergence of Cyber Warfare as the
Fourth Generation Warfare
2.1.4.3. The ambiguity of line between war,
peacetime and unidentified victory conditions
2.2. Law of War
2.2.1. The History of International Humanitarian Law
2.3. History of the Internet
2.4. Today’s Internet
2.5. Actors in Cyberspace
2.5.1. Netizens
2.5.2. Script kiddies
2.5.3. Hackers
(a) The white hat hackers
(b) The black hat hackers
(c) The grey hat hackers
2.5.4. Hacktivists
2.5.5. Patriot hackers
2.5.6. Cyber Insiders
2.5.7. Cyber Terrorists
2.5.8. Malware authors
2.5.9. Cyber Scammers
2.5.10. Organized Cybercriminals
2.5.11. Corporations
2.5.12. Cyber espionage agents
2.5.13. Cybermilitia
2.6. Arsenal of Cyber Warrior
2.7. The Nexus Between Cyber Warfare and International
Humanitarian Law
CHAPTER 3
CYBER WARFARE-CONCEPTUAL ANALYSIS
3.1. Analysis Of Different Cyber Terminologies In Cognition of the Concept
3.1.1. Cyberspace
3.1.2. Cyber Operations
3.1.3. Information Warfare
3.1.4. Cyber War
3.1.5. Cyber Warfare
3.1.6. Cyber-Crime
3.1.6.1. Hacking
3.1.6.2. Computer Viruses
3.1.6.3. Phishing
3.1.6.4. Spoofing
3.1.6.5. Phone Phishing
3.1.6.6. Internet Pharming
3.1.6.7. Publishing Pornographic Material In Electronic Form
3.1.6.8. Investment Newsletter
3.1.6.9. Credit Card Fraud
3.1.7. Cyber-attack
3.1.7.1. Shanghai Cooperation Organisation
3.1.7.2. Council of Europe's Convention on Cybercrime
3.1.7.3. US Army's DCSIN7 Handbook No. 1.02
3.1.7.4. Definition by M. Rossini
3.1.7.5. Definition in Tallinn Manual
3.1.7.6. Definition bv Oona Hathaway
3.1.7.7. The Recommended Definition
(a) Intent
(b) Motive
(c) Actors
(d) Means and methods
(e) Target
(f) Effects
3.2. The Comparison of Cyber-Attack, Cyber-Crime, and Cyber-Warfare
3.3. Cyber Operations and Incidents
3.3.1. Cyber-attack by the United States America
3.3.2. Russia and Chechnya
3.3.3. Kosovo and the U.S.A
3.3.4. Israel and Palestine
3.3.5. Estonia and Russia
3.3.6. Israel and Syria
3.3.7. Lithuania
3.3.8. Russia and Georgia
3.3.9. Russia and Kyrgystan
3.3.10. South Korea and the U.S.A
3.3.11. Iran
3.3.12. Myanmar
3.3.13. Operation Israel (Oplsrael)
3.3.14. Singapore
3.3.15. Operation Shady Rat
3.3.16. Red October malware
3.3.17. Wanna cry Ransomware attack
3.3.18. Attack on Yahoo
CHAPTER 4
USE OF FORCE AND CYBER ATTACKS
4.1. Principles or Norms to be followed during the Use of Force .
4.1.1. Jus in Bello
4.1.2. Jus ad Bellum
4.2. Prohibition on the use of force
4.2.1. Interpretation and the Scope of Article 2(4)
4.2.2. Crossing the threshold of use of force
4.2.3. Application by Analogy?
4.2.4. Leading Approaches
4.2.4.1. Instrument-Based Approach
4.2.4.2. Target-Based Approach
4.2.4.3. Effects-Based Approach
4.2.4.4. Normative Framework by Schmitt
4.2.4.5. Cyber-Physical Systems-Based Approach
4.2.4.6. The Approach by Noah Simmons
4.2.4.7. Tallinn Manual Approach
4.2.4.8. International Committee of Red Cross
4.2.4.9. Other Approaches
4.3. An Expedition through the Present to the Future
CHAPTER 5
USE OF FORCE - EXCEPTIONS
5.1. Technological Concerns with Cyber Crimes
5.1.1. Intrusion
5.1.2. Denial of Service
5.2. Effects of Cyber Attack on Victims vis-a-vis Right of
Self Defence
5.2.1. Revenge on Estonia
5.2.2. Stuxnet the Game Changer
5.2.3. The Moonlight Maze
5.2.4. Lockheed Martin’s
5.2.5. Compromise with US Military Security
5.3. Issues with Exercise of Right of Self Defence
5.3.1. Cyber Attack As An Armed Attack
5.3.1.1. Attribution
5.3.1.2. Jurisdiction
5.3.2. Use of Force in Self Defence
5.3.2.1. Necessity
5.3.2.2. Proportionality
5.3.2.3. Immediacy
5.3.2.4. Imminence
5.4. Anticipatory Self-defence/Pre-emptive/Preventive defence
5.5. Neutrality
5.6. Distinction
5.7. Counter Measures Other Than Use Of Force
5.8. Self-defence Vis A Vis Tallinn Manual
5.9. Other Legal Framework
5.9.1. Jus in Bello
5.9.2. Countermeasures
5.10. Legal Regimes That Directly Deal With Cyber Attacks
5.10.1. United Nations
5.10.2. North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
5.10.3. The Council of Europe
5.10.3. The Organisation of American States
5.10.4. Shanghai Cooperation Organisation
5.11. Legal Regimes That Deal Indirectly With Cyber Attacks
5.11.1. Law of Space
5.11.2. Law of seas
5.11.3. Telecommunications Law
5.11.4. Aviation Law
5.11.5. Treaty Law
CHAPTER 6
CYBER SECURITY POLICIES AND CYBER WARFARE - A CRITICAL ANALYSIS
6.1. Cyber Security: Indian Perspective
6.1.1. Cyber Security Policy-Need of the hour
6.1.2. Cyber Security Policy of India, 2013 & Countermeasure Framework
6.2. Cyber Warfare and Security- The Russian Perspective
6.2.1. Agencies and Organizations
6.2.2. Role of Hackers and Criminals in Russian Cyber Space Regime
6.2.3. Cyber uses in the generation of Kinetic Effects- Current Regime
6.2.4. The Cyber role in the Russian Propaganda
6.3. Cyber Security Policy: The United States Perspective
6.3.1. Strategic National Cyber Security Objective
6.3.2. Protecting Critical Infrastructure
6.4. Cyber Security Policy: The Chinese Perspective
6.4.1. Cyber Security Law of People’s Republic of China
6.4.1.1. Data Localization
6.4.1.2. Handling of Personal Information
6.4.1.3. Transfer of Personal Information
6.4.1.4. Identity Verification of Internet Users and
Protection of Minors
6.4.1.5. Draft Measures to expand Data Localization
and Cross-Border Transfer Requirements
6.5. Cyber Deterrence
6.5.1. Principles of Cyber Deterrence
6.5.1.1. Deterrence by Punishment
6.5.1.1.1. Conditions of successful Deterrence by Punishment
6.5.1.1.1.1. The credibility of the threat
6.5.1.1.1.2. Capability to display and use of force
6.5.1.1.1.3. Communication of the threat
6.5.1.2. Deterrence by Denial
6.5.2. Challenges to implement deterrence in cyberspace
6.5.2.1. Anonymity
6.5.2.2. Asymmetry
6.5.2.3. Super-Empowerment
6.5.2.4. Temporality
6.5.2.5. Scalability
6.5.3. Applying the existing law on armed conflict to cyber-warfare
6.5.4. Recommendations for successful implementation of the theory of deterrence
in cyberspace
CHAPTER 7
CONCLUSION AND SUGGESTIONS
|
