CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
WHAT IS LAW
ESSENTIAL INGREDIENTS OF LAW
NATURE, OBJECT AND FUNCTION OF LAW
SOURCES OF LAW
KINDS OF LAW
Imperative law
Physical Law or Law of Nature or Scientific Law
Natural Law or Moral Law
Conventional Law
Customary Law
Practical or Technical Law
International Law
Civil Law
Common Law
Statute Law
Law of equity
Constitutional Law
Administrative Law
Special Laws
THREE ORGANS OF GOVERNMENT
LEGISLATION
PROCESS OF LEGISLATION
ENACTED LAW OR STATUTE LAW
SUPREME AND SUBORDINATE LEGISLATION
MORALS AND LAW
Relationship between Morals and Law Morals are the basis of Law
(a) Morals are the test of Law
(b) Morals are the end of Law
(c) Morals are the part of Law
Distinction between Morals and Law
CHAPTER SUMMARY
CHAPTER II
RAWLS’ THEORY OF JUSTICE
MEANING OF THE TERM “JUSTICE”
PROCEDURAL JUSTICE
Perfect procedural justice
Imperfect procedural justice
Pure procedural justice
Quasi-pure procedural justice
Perfect procedural justice and imperfect procedural justice distinguished
LEGITIMACY
Obeying the law and civil disobedience
SOCIAL JUSTICE
PRINCIPLES OF SOCIAL JUSTICE
First principle—The principle of liberty
Second principle—The principle of distribution of opportunities and resources
Both the principles must be complied together
Principles apply directly to basic social structure
Principles do not directly apply to the components of basic social structure
Sequence of four stages
CHAPTER SUMMARY
CHAPTER III
THE MEANING, OBJECT AND NECESSITY OF
INTERPRETATION
MEANING OF INTERPRETATION
INTERPRETATION AND CONSTRUCTION
OBJECT AND PURPOSE OF INTERPRETATION
MEANING OF AMBIGUITY
Latent ambiguity
Patent ambiguity
NECESSITY TO INTERPRET A PROVISION
CHAPTER SUMMARY
CHAPTER IV
INTERPRETATION IS THE ART OF FINDING
THE TRUE LEGISLATIVE INTENT
CHAPTER SUMMARY
CHAPTERV
CERTAIN PRESUMPTIONS AND
CONSIDERATIONS IN INTERPRETATION
MEANING OF PRESUMPTION
MEANING OF CONSIDERATION
DISTINCTION BETWEEN PRESUMPTION AND CONSIDERATION
PRESUMPTIONS IN INTERPRETATION OF STATUTES
(i) Presumption as to validity of the statute
Doctrine of Pith and Substance
Colourable legislation
Repugnancy between Central and State Law
(ii) Presumption as to territorial operation of the statute
Theory of territorial nexus
(iii) Presumption that statutes are consistent with International Law
(iv) Presumption that Legislature does not commit mistake
(v) Presumption that Legislature does not use superfluous words
(vi) Presumption that words used by Legislature bear ordinary meaning
(vii) Presumption that Legislature has knowledge of English grammar
(viii) Presumption that Legislature knows law and judicial decisions
Precedent
Stare decisis
(ix) Presumption as to re-enactment
(x) Presumption that vested rights are preserved
(xi) Presumption that Legislature does not intend what is inconvenient
(xii) Presumption that Legislature does not intend any alteration in existing law except what it expressly declares
(xiii) Presumption against retrospectivity
(xiv) Presumption as to jurisdiction of courts
CONSIDERATIONS IN INTERPRETATION OF STATUTES
(i) Consideration of Absurdity
(ii) Consideration of Futility
(iii) Consideration of Reasonableness
(iv) Consideration of Injustice
(v) Consideration of Hardship
(vi) Consideration of Inconvenience
(vii) Consideration of Anomaly
(viii) Consideration of Consequences
CHAPTER SUMMARY
CHAPTER VI
THE PROCESS OF INTERPRETATION
GRAMMATICAL OR LITERAL INTERPRETATION
LIMITATIONS OF GRAMMATICAL OR LITERAL
INTERPRETATION
(i) Ambiguity
(ii) Inconsistency
(iii) Deficiency in the Act itself
LOGICAL INTERPRETATION
GRAMMATICAL/LITERAL AND LOGICAL INTERPRETATION
COMPARED
GRAMMATICAL/LITERAL INTERPRETATION TO BE PREFERRED
DISCOVERY OF LEGISLATIVE INTENT IS THE ULTIMATE GOAL
AN OVERVIEW OF SOME RULES OF STATUTORY INTERPRETATION
(a) Statute to be interpreted in tune with its object
(b) Statute should be construed in a manner to carry out
legislative intent
(c) Statute cannot be given retrospective effect
(d) Court cannot add, delete or substitute words or supply to deficiencies of the statute
(e) No provision should be interpreted in isolation
(f) Interpretation by which statute is turned to nullity should be discarded
(g) If the language of a statute is clear, it must be enforced
(h) Intention of Legislature is to be primarily gathered from the words used
(i) Plain, ordinary and natural meaning to be assigned to the words
(j) Meaning of a word depends on the context in which it is used
(k) Same words same meaning
(l) Words be given that meaning which they bore at the time of enactment
(m) Construction of general words
(n) Golden Rule
(o) Mischief Rule
(p) Harmonious Construction
(q) Strict and liberal construction
CHAPTER SUMMARY
CHAPTER VII
BASIC PRINCIPLES OF INTERPRETATION
(i) INTENTION OF LEGISLATURE
(ii) EX VISCERIBUS ACTUS
(iii) Application of the Principle of ex visceribus actus
(iv) UT RES MAGIS VALE AT QUAM PEREAT
Application of the Principle of ut res magis valeat quam pereat
CHAPTER SUMMARY
CHAPTER VIII
OTHER RULES OF INTERPRETATION
(i) RULE OF PLAIN AND ORDINARY MEANING
Application of the Rule of Plain and Ordinary Meaning
Departure from the rule of plain and ordinary meaning (When different meaning may be adopted)
(ii) LANGUAGE SHOULD BE READ AS IT IS
(a) Avoiding addition or substitution of any word
Application of the Rule
Departure from Rule (When Addition of Words is Permissible)
(b) Avoiding rejection of words
Application of the Rule
Departure from the Rule (Treating the Words as Superfluous and their Rejection is Permissible)
(c) Casus Omissus
Application of the Rule
Departure from the Rule (When omitted Words can be Supplied)
(iii) LEGAL FICTION OR DEEMING PROVISION
Interpretation of Provisions creating Legal Fiction
(iv) NON OBSTANTE CLAUSE
(v) MANDATORY AND DIRECTORY PROVISIONS
Mandatory Provisions
Directory Provisions
Distinction between Mandatory and Directory Provisions
Use of “shall” and “may” is not Decisive Factor
Statutes Providing Consequences are Mandatory in Nature
Use of Negative Words generally renders the Provision Mandatory
Negative word is not sole criteria to declare a provision Mandatory
(vi) CONJUNCTIVE AND DISJUNCTIVE WORDS
(vii) SAME WORD TO BEAR SAME MEANING UNLESS
OTHERWISE INTENDED
(viii) DIFFERENT WORDS ARE NOT USED IN SAME SENSE
(ix) RULE OF LAST ANTECEDENT
(x) RULES OF CONSTRUCTION OF GENERAL WORDS
(a) Noscitur A Sociis
Application of the Rule of Noscitur a Sociis
(b) Ejusdem Generis
Conditions for Application of Ejusdem Generis
Application of the Rule of Ejusdem Generis
Cases where the Court refused to apply the Rule of Ejusdem Generis
(c) Words of rank
(d) Reddendo Singula Singulis
Application of the Rule of Reddendo Singula Singulis
(xi) THINGS TO BE DONE AND POWER TO BE EXERCISED
IN THE SAME MANNER AS PRESCRIBED BY LAW
CHAPTER SUMMARY
CHAPTER IX
KINDS OF CONSTRUCTION
(i) LITERAL CONSTRUCTION
What is Natural and Ordinary Meaning
Justification of applying Natural and Ordinary Meaning
Application of the Rule of Natural and Ordinary Meaning
Technical Words to be understood in technical sense only
Application of the Rule of Technical Words in Technical Sense
Legal Sense of the Words
Abandonment of Literal Construction
Hardship or inconvenience is no ground to abandon literal construction
(ii) CONTEXTUAL INTERPRETATION
(iii) GOLDEN RULE
(iv) HEYDON’S CASE : HEYDON’S RULE : MISCHIEF RULE :
PURPOSIVE CONSTRUCTION
Applicability of Mischief Rule
Application of Mischief Rule
(v) HARMONIOUS CONSTRUCTION
Principles of Harmonious Construction
Generalia specialibus non derogant
Generalibus specialia derogant
Application of the Rule of Harmonious Construction
(vi) RULE OF READING DOWN
(vii) STRICT AND LIBERAL CONSTRUCTION
(viii) STRICT CONSTRUCTION OF TAXING OR FISCAL STATUTES
Principles of strict construction of taxing or fiscal statutes
Words not to be stretched against a tax-payer
Ambiguous words to be construed in favour of tax-payer
Hardships or equitable considerations to be ignored
Application of strict construction to taxing or fiscal statutes
Evasion of statutes
(ix) STRICT CONSTRUCTION OF PENAL STATUTES
Principles of strict construction of penal statutes
Courts cannot strain the words on any notion
Construction favourable to the accused must be preferred
Purpose of the statute must be kept in view
Mischief rule can be applied
Common-sense approach may be taken, if necessary
Application of language to developments in science and technology permitted
Application of strict construction of penal statutes
(x) LIBERAL CONSTRUCTION OF REMEDIAL STATUTES
Principles of Liberal or beneficent construction
Liberal construction can be applied only when there is clear ambiguity
That interpretation should be preferred by which benefit is extended
Benefits cannot be allowed in contravention of statutory provision
Application of Liberal or beneficent construction of remedial statutes
Distinction between remedial and penal statutes
CHAPTER SUMMARY
CHAPTER X
AIDS TO CONSTRUCTION
MEANING OF “AIDS TO CONSTRUCTION’
WHEN AIDS TO CONSTRUCTION CAN BE LEGITIMATELY INVOKED
KINDS OF AIDS TO CONSTRUCTION
CHAPTER SUMMARY
CHAPTER XI
INTERNAL AIDS TO CONSTRUCTION
(i) TITLE
Short Title
Long Title
Use of Title for Resolving an Ambiguity
Limitations of Title as Internal Aid to Construction
(ii) PREAMBLE
Limitations of Preamble as Internal Aid to Construction
(iii) DEFINITION OR INTERPRETATION CLAUSE
Kinds of definitions
Restrictive or Exhaustive definition
Inclusive or Extensive definition
Exception to the general rule that “Means is exhaustive” and Includes is Extensive”
Effect of Use of Words “Means and Includes” on Scope of Definition
Effect of Use of Words “Deemed to Include” on Scope of Definition
Effect of Use of Words “Includes” and “Shall Not Include” on Scope of Definition
Use of Definition for Resolving Ambiguity
(iv) HEADINGS
Limitations of Headings as Internal Aid to Construction
(v) MARGINAL NOTES
Use of Marginal Notes for Resolving Ambiguity
Limitations of Marginal Notes as Internal Aid to Construction
(vi) PUNCTUATION MARKS
Use of Punctuation Marks for Resolving Ambiguity
Limitations of Punctuation Marks as Internal Aid to Construction
(vii) ILLUSTRATION
Use of Illustrations for Resolving Ambiguity
Limitations of Illustration as Internal Aid to Construction
(viii) PROVISO
Real Nature and Function of Proviso
Use of Proviso for Resolving Ambiguity
Limitations of Proviso as Internal Aid to Construction
(ix) EXPLANATION
Limitations of Explanation as Internal Aid to Construction
(x) SCHEDULES
CHAPTER SUMMARY
CHAPTER XII
EXTERNAL AIDS TO CONSTRUCTION
(i) PARLIAMENTARY HISTORY
English Practice
(a) Traditional view
(b) Criticism of traditional view
(c) Modern view
(d) Objections on modern view
Indian Practice
What comprises Parliamentary History
(a) Debates on a Bill in the process of its passing
Use of Debates on a Bill for Resolving Ambiguity
Limitations of Debates on a Bill as External Aid to Construction
(b) Statement of Objects and Reasons accompanying a Legislative Bill
Use of Statement of Objects and Reasons for Resolving Ambiguity
Limitations of Statement of Objects and Reasons as External Aid to Construction
(c) Reports of Commission, Inquiry Committee, Joint
Parliamentary Committee or Study Group
Use of Reports of Commission, Inquiry Committee, Joint
Parliamentary Committee or Study Group for Resolving Ambiguity
Cases in Which Reports of Commission, Inquiry Committee, Joint Parliamentary Committee or Study Group Were Not Admitted
(ii) HISTORICAL FACTS AND SURROUNDING
CIRCUMSTANCES
Limitations of Historical Facts and Surrounding
Circumstances as External Aid to Construction
(iii) SUBSEQUENT SOCIAL, POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC
DEVELOPMENTS AND SCIENTIFIC INVENTIONS
(iv) DICTIONARIES
Use of Dictionaries for Resolving Ambiguity
Limitation of Dictionaries as External Aid to Construction
(v) TEXT BOOKS
(vi) STATUTES IN PARI MATERIA
When two Statutes are not in Pari Materia
Use of Statutes in Pari Materia for Resolving Ambiguity
Merits of the Rule of Reference to Statutes in Pari Materia
(vii) HELP FROM EARLIER STATUTES
Use of Earlier Statutes for Resolving Ambiguity
Amending Acts
(viii) HELP FROM SUBSEQUENT LEGISLATION
(ix) INCORPORATION OF EARLIER ACT INTO LATER
Effect of Incorporation
(x) CODIFYING STATUTES
Features of Codifying Statues
Construction of codifying statutes
(xi) CONSOLIDATING STATUTES
Features of consolidating statutes
Construction of consolidating statutes
Distinction between Codifying and Consolidating Statutes
(xii) CONTEMPORANEA EXPOSITIO
Application of Contemporanea Expositio
(xiii) FOREIGN DECISIONS OR FOREIGN JUDGMENTS
CHAPTER SUMMARY
CHAPTER XIII
TEMPORARY AND PERPETUAL STATUTES :
THEIR EXPIRY AND REPEAL
COMMENCEMENT OF STATUTE
KINDS OF STATUTES ON THE BASIS OF LIFE
TEMPORARY STATUTES
Expiry of temporary statutes
Effect of expiry of temporary statutes
PERPETUAL STATUTES
Repeal-of perpetual statute
Kinds of repeal
Express repeal
Essentials of express repeal
Implied repeal
Presumption against implied repeal
Test of implied repeal
General principles of implied repeal
Effect and consequences of repeal
Amending Act and its Effects on Principal Statute
CHAPTER SUMMARY
CHAPTER XIV
PROSPECTIVE AND RETROSPECTIVE
OPERATION OF STATUTES
MEANING OF OPERATION OF STATUTE
PROSPECTIVE OPERATION
RETROSPECTIVE OPERATION
LEGISLATURE IS COMPETENT TO MAKE RETROSPECTIVE LAW
PRESUMPTION AGAINST RETROSPECTIVITY
OPERATION OF VARIOUS KINDS OF STATUTES
(a) Statutes dealing with substantive rights are presumed to be prospective
(b) Statutes dealing with procedure are presumed to be retrospective
(c) Statutes governing succession are not retrospectively operated
(d) Statutes regulating transfers and contracts are not retrospectively operated
(e) Statutes prescribing limitation are prospective but may have retrospective operation for
certain matters
(f) Fiscal Statutes are prospective in respect of charging provisions but are retrospective in
respect of the provisions dealing with procedure
(g) Penal Statutes creating new offences or increasing penalty for existing offences are
prospective only
(h) Statutes prescribing future disqualification on past misconduct are not retrospective
(i) Remedial statutes are not necessarily retrospective
(j) Statutes dealing with appeals are prospective only
(k) Pending proceedings : alterations in procedure can be applied but alterations affecting
substantive right cannot be applied
ALTERATION OF SUBSTANTIVE RIGHTS
ALTERATION IN MATTERS OF PROCEDURE
CHAPTER SUMMARY
CHAPTER XV
DELEGATED AND CONDITIONAL LEGISLATION
MEANING OF LEGISLATION OR ENACTMENT
DOCTRINE OF SEPARATION OF POWERS
Law making power is vested in the Legislature
SUPREME AND SUBORDINATE LEGISLATION
DELEGATED LEGISLATION
REASONS FOR GROWTH OF DELEGATED LEGISLATION
CONTROL OVER DELEGATED LEGISLATION
Need to control the delegated legislation
Exercising control over delegated legislation
Parliamentary control over delegated legislation
Judicial control over delegated legislation
VALIDITY OF DELEGATED LEGISLATION
LIMITATIONS OF DELEGATED LEGISLATION
PRESENT STATUS OF DELEGATED LEGISLATION
POWER OF DELEGATION IS NOT ABSOLUTE
WHAT CAN BE DELEGATED
WHAT CANNOT BE DELEGATED
EXCESSIVE DELEGATION
CONDITIONAL LEGISLATION
DISTINCTION BETWEEN DELEGATED AND CONDITIONAL LEGISLATION
CHAPTER SUMMARY
CHAPTER XVI
INTERPRETATION OF STATUTES AFFECTING
JURISDICTION OF COURTS
MEANING OF JURISDICTION
WHAT IS “EXCLUSION OF JURISDICTION” OR “OUSTER OF JURISDICTION”
EXCLUSION OF JURISDICTION NOT TO BE READILY INFERRED
PRINCIPLES RELATING TO EXCLUSION OF JURISDICTION
APPLICATION OF THE RULE OF EXCLUSION OF JURISDICTION
EXTENT OF EXCLUSION
CHAPTER SUMMARY
CHAPTER XVII
CERTAIN LEGAL MAXIMS
Apactis privatorum publico juri non derogatur
A verbis legis non est recedendum
Ab abusu ad usum not valet consequentia
Ab inconvenienti
Ab initio
Absoluta sententia expositore non indiget
Abundans cautela non nocet
Accessorium non ducit, sedsequitur suum principale
Actio personalis moritur cum persona
Actus curiae neminem gravabit
Actus dei neminem gravabit
Actus non facit reum, nisi mens sit rea
Ad proximum antecedens fiat relation nisi impediatur sentential
Ambiguum pactum contra venditorem interpretandum est
Amicus curiae
Argumenturn a simili valet in lege
Argumentum ab auctoritate est fortissimum in lege
Argumenturn ab impossibili plurinum valet in lege
Argumentum ab inconvenienti plurinum valet in lege
Audi alteram partem
Boni judicis est jus dicere, non jus dare
Casus Omissus
Cogitationis pae mam nemo meretur
Consenus facit lagem
Contemporanea exposito est optima et fortissimo in lege
Contra legam facit, quid facit quod lexprohibet in fraudem vero qui salvis verbis legis sententiam ejus circum venit
Conventio vincit lagem
Copulatio verborum indicat acceptationem in eodem sensu
Crimina morte extinguuntur
Cui jurisdictio data est, ea quoque concessa esse videntur, sine quibus jurisdictio explicari non potuit
Cuilibet licet renuntiar juri prose introducto
Damnum sine injuria
De novo
Delegatus non potest delegare
Ejusdem Generis
Ex abusu non arqumentum ad desuetudinem
Ex antecedentibus et consequentibus fit optima interpretation
Ex majori cautela
Ex parte
Ex suo motu
Ex visceribus actus
Exempla illustrant, non-restringunt lagem
Executio juris non habet injuriam
Expressum facit cessare taciturn
Expressio unius est exclusio alterius
Fictio juris
Fictio legis neminem laedit nemini operatur damnum vel injuriam
Fractionem died non recipit lex
Generalia specialibus non derogant
Generalibus Specialia derogant
Generalia verba sunt generalita intelligenda
Hoc quidem perquam durum es sed ita lex scripta est
Ignorantia facti excusat; Ignorantia juris non excusat
In camera
In civile est nisi tota lege perspecta una aliqua particular ejus proposita judicare vel respondere
In fictione juris simper existit aeqtuitas
In pari delicto potior est conditio possidentis
In personam
In re
In rem
Inclusio unius exclusio alterius
Index animi sermo
Injuria sine damnum
Interest republicae ut sit finis litium
Leges posteriores priores contrarias abrogant
Lex non cogit and impossibilia
Nemo debet bis vexari pro una et eadem causa
Non exemplis, sed-legibus indicandum est
Non obligat lex nisi promulgate
Non obstante
Noscitur A Sociis
Nova constitutis futuris formam imponere debet, non praeteritis
Obiter dictum
Pari material
Per incuriam
Quando aliquid prohibetur, prohibetur et omne perquod devinetur ad illud
Ratihabitio priori mandato aequiparatur
Ratio decidendi
Reddendo Singula Singulis
Res sub judice
Res judicata
Res judicata pro veritate occipitur
Roy n’est lie per ascun statute, si il ne soit expressment nosme
Stare decisis et non quieta movere
Sub silentio
Ubi jus ibi remedium
Ut res magis valeat qauam pereat |
